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Abstract. The purposes of this article are twofold: (1) to consider the extent to which Dialogue
of Civilisations (DoC) initiatives, as alternative visions of post-secular world order, are likely
to address insecurities that they identify; and (2) to point to other insecurities that are likely
to remain unidentiﬁed and unaddressed in the process. In their present conception, DoC initia-
tives risk falling short of addressing the very insecurities they prioritise (the stability of inter-state
order) let alone attending to those experienced by non-state referents, which they overlook.
The article advances three points in three steps. First, I point to how projects of civilisational
dialogue have bracketed civilisation, thereby leaving intact the Huntingtonian notion of civili-
sations as religiously uniﬁed autochthonous entities. Second, I argue that while contributing
to opening up space for communication, DoC initiatives have nevertheless failed to employ a
dialogical approach to dialogue between civilisations. Third, I tease out the notion of security
underpinning DoC initiatives and argue that the proponents DoC, in their haste to avert a
clash, have deﬁned security narrowly as the absence of war between states belonging to differ-
ent civilisations. Theirs is also a shallow notion of security insofar as it fails to capture the
derivative character of security and insecurity.
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The secularisation thesis (which anticipated secularism gaining a stronger foothold
worldwide in tandem with modernisation) no longer commands the kind of authority
it once did as the way for ordering domestic polities and world politics. There is also
mounting empirical evidence pointing to the ways in which religion has continued to
shape the identities and practices of people in various parts of the world – including
those whose social and/or political orders have gone through secularisation. Such
evidence is considered by some as disproving the secularisation thesis and signalling
the dawn of a post-secular era for world politics.1
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1 Peter L. Berger (ed.), The Desecularisation of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics (Washing-
ton, DC: Ethics and Policy Center, 1999); Peter L. Berger, ‘Reﬂections on the Sociology of Religion
Today’, Sociology of Religion, 62:4 (2001), pp. 443–54.
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Still, these considerations may have less to do with the substance of the seculari-
sation thesis, or empirical evidence, but a change in consciousness. Writing about the
Northern sphere, Ju¨rgen Habermas has attributed such change in public consciousness
to broad perception that contemporary conﬂicts are rooted in religious differences;
that religion is increasingly becoming inﬂuential in shaping domestic polities; and
that religious difference has come closer to home following an increase in the numbers
and diversity of immigrants and refugees.2 In the global sphere, there is increasing
awareness of the persistence of religious worldviews; their efﬁcacy in shaping domestic
and foreign policies of different actors around the world (including non-state actors);
and the limitations of existing world order norms in addressing possible consequen-
ces of such difference.3
While it is by no means a foregone conclusion that a post-secular world order
would be characterised by insecurity, the tone of present-day debates suggests other-
wise. Since the 1979 revolution in Iran, the so-called ‘return’ of religion has been
portrayed as an ill omen for world security. Consider Daniel Pipes’s polemical essay
from 1990 entitled ‘The Muslims are Coming! The Muslims are Coming!’4 that
pointed to religious difference as a source of insecurity for the United States both
internally (immigration) and internationally (relations with Muslim powers). Also
consider Samuel P. Huntington’s 1993 essay entitled ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’
where the author warned about desecularisation of the world as an ominous trend
leading toward a clash of states belonging to different civilisations (deﬁned largely
along religious lines by the author).5
Such concerns, in turn, have their roots in an often-unacknowledged bond between
secularism and security.6 Secularisation of Western Europe is generally considered as
having brought confessional violence of early modern eras to an end.7 Now that the
secularisation thesis is waning, disquiets have been voiced about possible reoccurrence
of such kind of violence. Of those concerned about the challenge of post-secularism
for security, while some (such as Pipes and Huntington) have warned about a com-
ing clash and called for strengthening one’s own (internally and internationally),
2 Ju¨rgen Habermas, ‘Religion in the Public Sphere’, European Journal of Philosophy, 14:1 (2006), pp. 1–
25; Ju¨rgen Habermas, ‘Secularism’s Crisis of Faith’, New Perspectives Quarterly (Fall 2008), pp. 16–29.
3 Rajeev Bhargava (ed.), Secularism and its Critics (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998); Rajeev Bhargava,
‘States, Religious Diversity, and the Crisis of Secularism’, openDemocracy {www.opendemocracy.net}
accessed 22 March 2011.
4 Daniel Pipes, ‘The Muslims are Coming! The Muslims are Coming!’, National Review (November 1990),
pp. 28–31.
5 Huntington’s article came out in the US policy magazine Foreign Affairs in 1993. Three years later he
published the book length version. While the book’s style was more nuanced than the article regarding
the inevitability of a clash, the disappearance of the question mark in the title suggested that the author
was no less conﬁdent of his conclusions. See, Samuel P. Huntington, ‘Clash of Civilizations?’, Foreign
Affairs, 72:3 (1993) pp. 22–49; Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of
World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).
6 Michael C. Williams, ‘Identity and the politics of security’, European Journal of International Relations,
4:2 (1998), pp. 204–25; Pinar Bilgin, ‘The Securityness of secularism? The case of Turkey’, Security Dia-
logue, 39:6 (2008), pp. 593–614.
7 But see, Carsten Bagge Lautsen and Ole Wæver, ‘In Defense of Religion: Sacred Referent Objects for
Securitization’, in Pavlos Hatzopoulos and Fabio Petito (eds), Religion in International Relations: The
Return from Exile (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. 147–80; Luca Mavelli, ‘Security and secu-
larization in International Relations’, European Journal of International Relations, 18:1 (2011), pp. 177–
99.
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others (as with Habermas) have pointed to the shortcomings of secularism in respond-
ing to contemporary challenges and called for envisioning alternative post-secular
orders.8
The purposes of this article are twofold: (1) to consider the extent to which such
alternative visions of post-secular world order are likely to address insecurities they
identify; and (2) to point to other insecurities that are likely to remain unidentiﬁed
and unaddressed in the process. Toward this end, I focus on one speciﬁc vision of
post-secular world order, namely Dialogue of Civilisations (DoC). DoC refers to
the combined efforts of a group of state and non-state actors toward generating un-
fettered communication between those belonging to different ‘civilisations’. Although
civilisational dialogue initiatives are no more than ‘a set of ideas, which are often
generic but increasingly perceived as a political necessity all over the world to some-
how contribute to a more peaceful and just world order’,9 they are increasingly
offered as our best response in light of the challenge of post-secularism.10
That said there is no agreement, as yet, among proponents of DoC regarding
what post-secularism means for them. While academic writings have appreciated the
project of DoC as an embodiment of the spirit of post-secularism, state level DoC
practices have come to constrain such ideas. Whereas academic authors have encour-
aged delving deeper into the meaning(s) of post-secularism and ‘question and probe
the concept of the secular, and to re-interrogate the whole ‘‘faith versus reason’’
problematic that has so consistently punctuated modern thought’11 (including notions
of in/security), state-level representations of DoC have given way to an impression of
post-secularism as tantamount to insecurity.
The following argues that, as alternative visions of post-secular world order, DoC
initiatives risk falling short of addressing those insecurities they prioritise (that is, the
stability of inter-state order), let alone attending to those experienced by non-state
referents, which they overlook. The article advances three points in three steps. First,
I point to how projects of civilisational dialogue have bracketed civilisation, thereby
leaving intact the Huntingtonian notion of civilisations as religiously uniﬁed autoch-
thonous entities. Second, building on a Bakhtinian notion of dialogue, I argue that
while contributing to opening up space for communication, DoC initiatives have
8 For elaborations on Habermas, see, Mariano Barbato, ‘Conceptions of the Self for Post-secular Eman-
cipation: Towards a Pilgrim’s Guide to Global Justice’, Millennium – Journal of International Studies,
39:2 (2010), pp. 547–64; Olav Hevdelien, ‘Post-Secular Consensus? On the Munich-dialogue between
Joseph Ratzinger and Juergen Habermas’, Australian eJournal of Theology, 18:2 (2011), pp. 107–16.
9 Fabio Petito, ‘Dialogue of Civilizations As An Alternative Model for World Order’, in Michalis S.
Michael and Fabio Petito (eds), Civilizational Dialogue and World Order: The Other Politics of Cultures,
Religions, and Civilizations in International Relations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 47.
10 Marc Lynch, ‘The Dialogue of Civilisations and International Public Spheres’, Millenium: Journal of
International Studies, 29:2 (2000), pp. 307–30; Fred Dallmayr, Dialogue Among Civilizations: Some
Exemplary Voices (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); Michalis S. Michael and Fabio Petito (eds),
Civilizational Dialogue and World Order: The Other Politics of Cultures, Religions, and Civilizations in
International Relations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Fabio Petito, ‘In Defence of Dialogue
of Civilizations: With a Brief Illustration of the Diverging Agreement between Edward Said and Louis
Masignon’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 39:3 (2011), pp. 759–79.
11 Gregor McLennan, ‘Towards Postsecular Sociology?’, Sociology, 41:5 (2007), p. 859. As Petito and
Hatzopoulos have argued, such debates would allow inquiry into prevalent assumptions about the
proper relationship between the sacred and the profane that has made Huntington’s thesis possible. Be
that as it may, my aim here is to discuss the limitations of DoC as one response to the challenge of post-
secularism, but not to interrogate the conditions of possibility of that challenge. See, (Fabio Petito and
Pavlos Hatzopoulos, ‘The Return from Exile: An Introduction’ in Petito and Hatzopoulos (eds), Reli-
gion in International Relations, pp. 1–20.
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nevertheless failed to employ a dialogical approach to dialogue between civilisations.
Third, I tease out the notion of security underpinning DoC initiatives and argue that
the proponents DoC, in their haste to avert a clash, have deﬁned security narrowly as
the absence of war between states belonging to different civilisations. Theirs is also a
shallow notion of security in so far as it fails to capture the derivative character of
security and insecurity. This threefold conceptual limitation, I argue, does not allow
fostering dialogue. Such failure to fulﬁl the promise of dialogue, in turn, is a manifes-
tation of the limitations of DoC as an alternative vision of post-secular world order.
Limitations of DoC initiatives become apparent when judged not only by the
standards their proponents set for themselves but also by the standards of critical
approaches to security.12 This is not only because they privilege the stability of world
order over and above non-state referents, but also because they lack sociological
insights into power/knowledge dynamics within civilisations, which, in turn, allows
them to overlook myriad insecurities experienced by non-state referents. Whereas
considering civilisations in relationist (as opposed to essentialist) and dialogically
constituted (as opposed to autochthonous) terms, while paying due attention to
non-state referents and their myriad insecurities (as opposed to relying on a statist
and military-focused conception of security) would likely allow a sounder response
in light of the challenge of post-secularism.
Two caveats are in order: First, the following deﬁnes post-secularism as under-
stood in present-day policy discourse. I have limited my task here to discussing those
challenges tied up with above-mentioned change in consciousness regarding secularism
and insecurities that are feared to follow – but not the constitutive effects of the
‘secular’ and the ‘religious’ on security. That said, if Jose´ Casanova is correct in
arguing that secularisation in Western Europe ‘can be better explained in terms of
the triumph of the knowledge regime of secularism’ through the Enlightenment’s
‘ideological critique of religion’ as opposed to structural socioeconomic factors
alone,13 then, emergence of a knowledge regime of post-secularism could potentially
have important consequences for the future of secularism.
The second caveat is regarding the apparent persistence of religion and/or decline
of secularism; empirical evidence does not speak for itself. To quote Maeve Cooke,
‘the persistence of religious world views in secularized social orders can just as easily
be taken as an argument for a secular political domain as for a post-secular one’.14
Furthermore, the secularisation thesis rests on a particular deﬁnition of secularism
12 My aim here is not to unpack ‘security’. Critical security studies offer multiple ways for approaching
security critically. In what follows, I will be building upon the insights of critical security studies
to problematise the notion of security DoC projects have built upon. On critical security studies see,
for example, Ken Booth, ‘Security and Emancipation’, Review of International Studies, 17:4 (1991),
pp. 313–26; Barry Buzan, People, states, and fear: an agenda for international security studies in the
post-cold war era (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991); Ronnie D. Lipschutz (ed.), On Security
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (eds), Critical
Security Studies: Concepts and Cases (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1997); Barry
Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, Security: a new framework for analysis (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne
Rienner Pub., 1998); Ken Booth, Theory of World Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2007).
13 Jose Casanova, ‘Religion, European Secular Identities, and European Integration’, in Timothy A. Byrnes
and Peter J. Katzenstein (eds), Religion in an Expanding Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2006), p. 84.
14 Maeve Cooke, ‘A Secular State for a Postsecular Society? Postmetaphysical Political Theory and the
Place of Religion’, Constellations, 14:2 (2007), pp. 224–38.
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(as ‘the process of religious decline’) whereas experiences worldwide reveal the exis-
tence and persistence of a plurality of secularisms in theory and practice. Accord-
ingly, the decline of the secularisation thesis need not be taken to mean the decline
of secularism. In view of that, Rajeev Bhargava has lately called for ‘improving’ our
current understanding of secularism based on the ‘best practices’ of existing secular
systems in different parts of the world – as opposed to, that is, ‘getting stuck on
models . . . developed at a particular point in [Western] history’ and lamenting their
decreasing relevance for contemporary world politics.15 Failing to heed Bhargava’s
plea, contributors to recent debates seem to have taken for granted the impending
dawn of a post-secular era, as they point to the shortcomings of secularism in respond-
ing to contemporary challenges of world politics and the need for alternative post-
secular orders.16 This article seeks to contribute to this literature by way of highlight-
ing the limitations of one particular model of post-secular world order.
The article begins by presenting a brief overview of the clash thesis and state-level
DoC initiatives. The three sections that follow highlight the threefold limitation of
DoC initiatives in conceptualising the notions of civilisation, dialogue, and security.
Do not clash; have dialogue
The academic discipline of International Relations (IR) came into being in the context
of two destructive world wars, as a ‘modern’ social science built upon assumptions of
the secularisation thesis.17 In the face of the 1990s’ so-called ‘return’ of religion, IR
was not equipped to address religious or other forms of ‘difference’.18 Consequently,
it was Huntington’s clash thesis that carried the day in the 1990s by offering a way of
making sense of the apparent return of religion albeit within an all-too-familiar Cold
War ‘us vs. them’ framework.
Notwithstanding its scientiﬁc limitations,19 Huntington’s clash thesis has had a
life outside the scholarly realm, being picked up by pundits and policymakers in
different parts of the world.20 Conversely, some other opinion- and policymakers
worried about Huntington’s thesis becoming a self-fulﬁlling prophecy. Such concerns
15 Bhargava, ‘States, Religious Diversity, and the Crisis of Secularism’.
16 See, for example, Fabio Petito and Pavlos Hatzopoulos (eds), Religion in International Relations: The
Return from Exile (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Friedrich V. Kratochwil, ‘Religion and (inter-)
national politics: On the heuristics of identities, structures, and agents’, Alternatives, 30:2 (2005),
pp. 113–40; Timothy A. Byrnes and Peter J. Katzenstein (eds), Religion in an expanding Europe
(Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Barbato, ‘Conceptions of the Self
for Post-secular Emancipation’, pp. 547–64. But see Pasha in this Special Issue.
17 Vendulka Kuba´lkova´, ‘Towards an international political theology’, Millennium-Journal of International
Studies, 29:3 (2000), pp. 675–704; Petito and Hatzopoulos (ed.), Religion in International Relations;
Friedrich Kratochwil, ‘Religion and (inter-)national politics: On the heuristics of identities, structures,
and agents’, Alternatives, 30:2 (2005), pp. 113–40.
18 Naeem Inayatullah and David L. Blaney, International Relations and the Problem of Difference (London:
Routledge, 2004).
19 Errol A. Henderson and Richard Tucker, ‘Clear and Present Strangers: The Clash of Civilizations and
International Conﬂict’, International Studies Quarterly, 45:2 (2001), pp. 317–38; Giacomo Chiozza, ‘Is
There a Clash of Civilizations? Evidence from Patterns of International Conﬂict Involvement, 1946–97’,
Journal of Peace Research, 39:6 (2002); Erik Gartzke and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, ‘Identity and Con-
ﬂict: Ties that Bind and Differences that Divide’, European Journal of International Relations, 12:1
(2006) 53–87.
20 On the reception Huntington received in Estonia, see, Merje Kuus, ‘European Integration in Identity
Narratives in Estonia: A Quest for Security’, Journal of Peace Research, 39:1 (2002), pp. 91–108. On
the frequent invocation of Huntingtonian assumptions and arguments during the Bosnian conﬂict, see,
Lene Hansen, ‘Past as Preface: Civilizational Politics and the ‘‘Third’’ Balkan War’, Journal of Peace
Research, 37:3 (2000), pp. 345–62.
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were not without basis in that over the years, extremists in the Muslim World have
mirrored the clash thesis in calling on the Muslims to unite behind the cause of jihad,
revive the Islamic civilisation, and rise against the West.
The efforts of those who sought to prevent what they feared was an impending
clash culminated in the Fall of 1998 with UN member states declaring the year 2001
as ‘UN Year of Dialogue among Civilizations’.21 ‘Dialogue among civilizations is an
absolute imperative’22 said Iranian President Kha #tamı # (1997–2005), one of the major
players behind the proposal. Contextualising the need for dialogue in the process of
globalisation and increase in peoples’ awareness of their differences in present-day
world politics, Kha#tamı #offered the UN initiative as an attempt to minimise the efﬁcacy
of the clash thesis in shaping policy.
Kha #tamı #’s term in presidency has since come to an end. While the former Iranian
president continues to pursue DoC through his Geneva-based Foundation, current
Iranian leadership does not seem as committed to civilisational dialogue.23 Still,
Kha #tamı #’s vision for ordering the world through civilisational dialogue is alive albeit
in a different guise: ‘Alliance of Civilizations’ initiative sponsored jointly by Spain
and Turkey under the auspices of the UN and supported by both the European Union
and the Vatican.24
Alliance of Civilisations was ﬁrst presented to the United Nations by Spanish
Prime Minister Zapatero. Following UN Secretary General Annan’s advice, Spain
invited Turkey to co-chair the initiative.25 Prime Minister Erdog˘an responded positively
to the Spanish invitation and assumed co-chairmanship of the Alliance of Civilisa-
tions in 2006.26 This was not the ﬁrst time that Turkey was involved in civilisational
dialogue. In 2002, Foreign Minister Cem had hosted in I˙stanbul a joint meeting of
the leaders of the European Union and the Organization of Islamic Conference
(OIC-EU Joint Forum).27
Among state level proponents of DoC, one can count Iran under President Kha#tamı #,
the Czech Republic under President Havel,28 as well as Spain and Turkey. Over the
years, the United Nations (UN), United Nations Educational, Scientiﬁc, and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO),29 European Union (EU), and the Vatican have also
expressed support. Among non-state proponents, there is the World Public Forum’s
21 Further information on this initiative is available at: {http://www.un.org/Dialogue/} accessed 19
September 2011.
22 Quoted in: John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, ‘Islam and the West: Muslim Voices of Dialogue’, in
Pavlos Hatzopoulos and Fabio Petito (eds), Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 250.
23 The former president’s dialogue-themed addresses have since then been removed from the website of the
Iranian representation to the UN.
24 For the ‘Alliance of Civilizations’ initiative, see {http://www.unaoc.org/} accessed 17 January 2012.
25 Laia Mestres and Eduard Soler i Lecha, ‘Spain and Turkey: A Long-Lasting Alliance in a Turbulent
Context?’, Insight Turkey, 8:2 (2006), pp. 117–26.
26 One factor behind PM Erdog˘an’s wholehearted embrace of DoC was his chief foreign policy advisor
Ahmet Davutog˘lu (present minister of foreign affairs) who has written extensively on civilisations
in a previous life as a professor of International Relations. See, for example, Ahmet Davutog˘lu, Civiliza-
tional Transformation and the Muslim World (Mahir Publications, 1994); Ahmet Davutog˘lu, ‘Medeniyet-
lerin Ben-idraki [Self-cognition of Civilizations]’, Divan Ilmi Arastırmalar Dergisi, 1 (1997), pp. 1–53.
27 {http://www.mfa.gov.tr/brief-summary-of-the-proceedings-of-the-oic-eu-joint-forum.en.mfa} accessed 19
September 2011.
28 As Petito notes, President Havel did not use DoC formulation. He is nevertheless counted among
the proponents of DoC by virtue of the content of his message. See, Fabio Petito, ‘The Global Political
Discourse of Dialogue among Civilizations: Mohammad Khatami and Va´clav Havel’, Global Change,
Peace & Security, 19:2 (2007), pp. 10–26.
29 {www.unesco.org/dialogue/index/html} accessed 25 July 2012.
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‘Dialogue of Civilizations’, which deﬁnes itself as a ‘deliberative-consultative body’;30
former Iranian President Kha#tamı #’s dialogue foundation;31 and ‘ResetDOC (Dialogue
on Civilizations)’ a web magazine set up by an Italian non-proﬁt association based
in Rome.32 Since then, proponents of DoC initiatives have established grounds for
communication where none existed; nurtured inter-faith conversations where possible;
and, perhaps most importantly, showed that inter-state interaction could aim for
more than the dichotomy of diplomacy vs. use of force.33
Civilisation
This section argues that the proponents of DoC, as they sought to prevent a clash,
have bracketed civilisation. In doing so, they have offered a correction in terms of
highlighting the peaceful essence of civilisations and the potential for peaceful relations
between civilisations. Yet at the same time, DoC initiatives have failed to do away
with the essentialism of the clash thesis or the notion of civilisations as autochthonous
entities.
The notion of civilisation on which the clash thesis rests is essentialist because
Huntington attributes civilisations a primordial essence, which, in turn, renders partic-
ular societal characteristics and institutional arrangements ‘natural’ and ‘eternal’. In
contrast to such essentialism are ‘relationist’34 and ‘dialectical’35 approaches that
view civilisations as mutually constituted and always in motion. While relationism
looks at civilisations as ‘unfolding processes and projects, sets of social practices
that serve to draw and re-draw boundaries between entities’,36 the dialectical ap-
proach sees ‘relatively dichotomous transformations of multi-layered, differently
paced, contradictory and synthetic developments’ – as opposed to, that is, ‘presumably
coherent, religiously uniﬁed, and often exclusive civilizational entities that appear in
Huntington’s pages’.37
In conjunction with Huntington’s essentialism is his understanding of civilisations
as autochthonous entities. This assumption crystallises in Huntington’s depiction of
the ‘West’:
The West differs from other civilizations in the distinctive character of its values and institu-
tions. These include most notably its Christianity, pluralism, individualism, and rule of law,
which made it possible for the West to invent modernity, expand throughout the world, and
become the envy of other societies. In their ensemble these characteristics are peculiar to the
West . . . They make Western civilization unique, and Western civilization is valuable not
because it is universal but because it is unique.38
30 {http://www.wpfdc.org/} accessed 17 January 2012.
31 {http://dialoguefoundation.org/} accessed 17 January 2012.
32 {www.reset.org} accessed 17 January 2012.
33 Lynch, ‘The Dialogue of Civilisations and International Public Spheres’, pp. 337–50; Dallmayr, Dialogue
Among Civilizations; Esposito and Voll, ‘Islam and the West’; Petito, ‘The Global Political Discourse
of Dialogue among Civilizations’; Petito, ‘Dialogue of Civilizations As An Alternative Model for World
Order’.
34 Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, ‘ ‘‘Civilization’’ on Trial’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 28:1
(1999), p. 142.
35 Hayward R. Alker, ‘If Not Huntington’s ‘‘Civilizations’’ Then Whose?’, Review (Fernand Braudel Center),
XVIII:4 (1995), pp. 533–62.
36 Jackson, ‘ ‘‘Civilization’’ on Trial’, p. 142.
37 Alker, ‘If Not Huntington’s ‘‘Civilizations’’, Then Whose?’, p. 534.
38 Huntington quoted in John M. Hobson, ‘The Myth of the Clash of Civilizations in Dialogical-Historical
Context’, in Pinar Bilgin and Paul D Williams (eds), Global Security, in Encyclopedia of Life Support
Systems (EOLSS) {www.eolss.net}.
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What allows such portrayals of the Western civilisation to prevail, according to John
Hobson, is Eurocentrism. Huntington’s Eurocentrism is evident in ‘his belief that the
West developed in its own unique or exceptional institutions, which enabled it to
rise to the top entirely of its own accord’.39 Furthermore, Huntington attributes
agency to the Western civilisation in the evolution of what is popularly referred to
as the civilised way of life while overlooking the contributions of others.40 As such,
Huntington does not only view civilisations as autochthonous entities but also in
terms of a hierarchy, with the West sitting on top of the civilisational ladder.41 As
will be argued below, while DoC initiatives have, in principle, rejected such hierar-
chical portrayals of world civilisations, they have nevertheless been built on a notion
of civilisation that is not very different from the clash thesis.
First, DoC notion of civilisation, too, is essentialist. Major proponents of DoC
deﬁne civilisations along religious lines; take religions as uniﬁed entities; and believe
in an unchanging religious essence that could be revived in the peaceful environment
dialogue would allow. Pope Benedict XVI for example, foresees dialogue as taking
place between pre-given entities that meet each other to exchange ideas and, if possible,
ﬁnd common ground. In the famous Munich Paper of 2004, Pope Benedict XVI
(then Cardinal Ratzinger) wrote:
For Christians, this dialogue would speak of the creation and the Creator. In the Indian world,
this would correspond to the concept of ‘dharma’, the inner law that regulates all Being; in the
Chinese tradition, it would correspond to the idea of the structures ordained by heaven.42
A similar outlook was also evident in President Kha #tamı #’s characterisation of the
ideal process of dialogue: ‘[absorbing] good qualities of the West while rejecting its
negative aspects’43 – his presumption being whatever is ‘good’ and/or ‘negative’
about the West or Islam is in their ‘essence’ (but not in historical processes of co-
constitution). Turkey’s Prime Minister Erdog˘an exhibited a similar attitude toward
dialogue in his address to students leaving for abroad to conduct postgraduate studies.
He said: ‘The poet who penned the Turkish national anthem [Mehmet Akif Ersoy]
said that we should compete with the West in art and science; but unfortunately we
got the West’s immoralities, which are contrary to our values.’44 All three prominent
proponents of civilisational dialogue determine what to pick and choose in the process
of dialogue based on the assumption that there is a religious essence to civilisations;
that such essence remains unchanging; and what need reviving through dialogue are
39 John M. Hobson, ‘Deconstructing the Eurocentric Clash of Civilizations: De-Westernizing the West
by Acknowledging the Dialogue of Civilizations’, in Martin Hall and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson (eds),
Civilizational Identity: The Production and Reproduction of ’Civilizations’ in International Relations (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 153.
40 In contrast to such monological readings of the history of civilisations is Hobson’s dialectical reading
that reveals centuries of co-constitution (see the next section for further discussion).
41 John M. Hobson, The Eurocentric conception of world politics: Western international theory, 1760–2010
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). esp. chap. 11.
42 Quoted in Hevdelien, ‘Post-secular Consensus?’, p. 113. On Pope Benedict XVI’s notion of civilisation
and practices of dialogue, see Luca Mavelli, Europe’s Encounter with Islam: The Secular and the Post-
secular (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), pp. 115–23.
43 Khatami as quoted in Esposito and Voll, ‘Islam and the West’, p. 254.
44 ‘Erdog˘an, ‘Batının Ahlaksızlıklarını Aldık’ [Erdog˘an: ‘‘We Got the West’s Immoralities’’]’, Milliyet, 24
January 2008.
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techniques and technologies so that such essence can once again be brought to bear
on one’s own peoples.45
Second, proponents of DoC, too, assume civilisations to be autochthonous entities.
Even as they acknowledge civilisational interaction, they imagine such give-and-take
to be happening at the fringes. Consider the following quote by President Kha #tamı #:
Civilizations rise and fall . . . Unless they are completely unaware of each other’s existence,
civilizations ordinarily affect and transform one another . . . Give-and-take among civilizations
is the norm of history . . . Thus ‘new’ civilizations are never new in the true sense, for they
always feed on the work of previous civilizations, appropriating and digesting all that ﬁts their
needs, dispensing with all that does not.46
Through portraying interaction between civilisations as taking place ‘only at their
edges’47 DoC initiatives have thereby left intact the pre-given notion of civilisations
as religiously uniﬁed autochthonous entities.
Indeed, DoC initiatives, even when they portray the West with reference to its
secular achievements, still deﬁne it in terms of a religious heritage in that they view
secularism to be a feature of the Judeo-Christian tradition that others are presumed
to lack.48 Even as they hail the non-West, they do this by portraying its positive
aspects as isolated to religious beliefs and texts alone. Such dichotomisation of civili-
sations in terms of their spiritual vs. rational past/present, in turn, (re)institutes a
hierarchy of civilisations that DoC initiatives have otherwise sought to move away
from. Such hierarchy is evident in former Czech President Havel’s words quoted
below:
if the East can borrow democracy and its inherent values from the West as a space in which a
reawakening sense of the transcendental can restore authority, then the West can learn from
the East what true authority is, what it grows from, and how it conducts itself.49
Even as he envisions a scheme of give and take between civilisations, Havel institutes
a hierarchical relationship. Whereas the East is portrayed as exemplary in terms of
being in touch with its spiritual roots, the West is not viewed as wholly deﬁcient on
that ground. The transcendental, stresses Havel, has roots in the West that could be
revived. However, when it comes to ownership of democracy, Havel sees no level
playing ﬁeld. While he portrays the West as having ownership of democracy, the
East is represented as in clear need for ‘borrowing’. However, as Amartya Kumar
Sen has reminded time and again,
there is no empirical reason at all why all champions of the Muslim past, or for that matter of
the Arab heritage, have to concentrate speciﬁcally on religious beliefs only, and not also on
science and mathematics, to which Arab and Muslim societies have contributed so much, and
which can also be a part of a Muslim or an Arab identity.50
45 This is a process Ahmet Davutog˘lu depicts as ben-idraki (self-cognition). See the following section for
a discussion on how this notion of DoC is not in tune with the ethics or epistemology of dialogical
approaches in the Bakhtinian sense.
46 Quoted in Esposito and Voll, ‘Islam and the West’, p. 254.
47 Hobson, ‘The Myth of the Clash of Civilizations in Dialogical-Historical Context’.
48 On two traditions of secularism, namely Judeo-Christian secularism and laicism, see Elizabeth Shakman
Hurd, The politics of secularism in international relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).
49 Quoted in Petito, ‘The Global Political Discourse of Dialogue among Civilizations’, p. 121.
50 Amartya Kumar Sen, Identity and violence: the illusion of destiny (New York: W. W. Norton & Co.,
2006), p. 15. Also see his: Amartya Kumar Sen, The argumentative Indian: writings on Indian history,
culture, and identity (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005).
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The point being, bracketing civilisation has the effect of constraining as opposed to
fostering dialogue. For, when people are encouraged to ﬁnd themselves solely in their
religious heritage, the pluralism and power/knowledge dynamics within civilisations
are often left unacknowledged (see the ﬁnal section), and they are less likely to seek
common ground when conducting dialogue on issues that are ostensibly not a part of
their heritage (as with human rights).
Dialogue
As they bracketed civilisation, proponents of DoC have concentrated their efforts on
fostering dialogue. In doing so, they have aspired to a radically different vision of
world order than allowed by the clash thesis. Indeed as Marc Lynch has highlighted,
whereas the clash thesis rested on the ‘realist assumption that no public sphere
existed which would enable meaningful communication between civilizations’, DoC
initiatives have claimed an ‘international public sphere within which communicative
action might take place’.51 This section of the article submits that the promise for
fostering dialogue between civilisations is likely to remain unfulﬁlled unless the notion
of ‘dialogue’ is further ﬂeshed out.52
Arguably, the notion of dialogue on which DoC initiatives rest has remained
unelaborate because replacing ‘clash’ with ‘dialogue’ was considered enough of an
improvement upon otherwise grim prospects for world order offered by the clash
thesis. Be that as it may, dialogue and clash are not the total opposites they are
understood to be in everyday terms. It is possible to have a dialogue in and through
violent clashes (as with dialogue and learning that took place during the Crusades).
Conversely, it is possible to maintain a monologue while purportedly engaging in
dialogue (as with the Israelis and Palestinians during the peace talks held in the
immediate aftermath of the ﬁrst Gulf War).53 Fostering dialogue, then, entails further
elaboration on the notion of dialogue. In offering this argument, this section of the
article builds upon Xavier Guillaume’s study on Bakhtinian distinction between dia-
logical and monological.54
In Bakhtinian terms, dialogical utterances are deﬁned by the extent to which they
take ‘the other’ into account. Whereas monologism ‘denies the existence outside itself
of another consciousness with equal rights and equal responsibilities, another I with
equal rights’, dialogism is characterised by transgradience whereby ‘the self alone
cannot feel itself within its own realm of existence, since, according to the idea of
transgradience (constitutive of dialogism), a person truly is herself only to the extent
51 Lynch, ‘The Dialogue of Civilisations and International Public Spheres’, p. 311.
52 On different kinds of dialogue as applied to IR, see Knud Erik Jorgensen and Morten Valbjorn, ‘Four
dialogues and the funeral of a beautiful relationship: European studies and new regionalism’, Coopera-
tion and Conﬂict, 47:1 (2012), pp. 3–27.
53 The deadlock brought about by monological practices of ‘dialogue’ was broken by the Oslo talks in
1993.
54 Xavier Guillaume, ‘Foreign Policy and the Politics of Alterity: A Dialogical Understanding of Interna-
tional Relations’, Millenium: Journal of International Studies, 31:1 (2000), pp. 1–26. On Bakhtin, also
see, Iver B. Neumann, Uses of the Other: ‘the East’ in European Identity Formation (Minneapolis:
Minnesota University Press, 1999); Iver B. Neumann, ‘International relations as emergent Bakhtinian
dialogue’, International Studies Review, 5:1 (2003), pp. 137–40.
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that she can integrate the regard of the other’.55 In this sense, dialogue is both an
ethical and an epistemological practice. Whereas
[m]onological utterances . . . stand on an unsound ethical and epistemological position. In
fact, they tend to subvert the other, and do not allow it a proper conscience that is reﬂexively
identical to them. Within a monological ﬁguration, the other becomes an object of the self ’s
own conscience, which can be interpreted and modiﬁed at will as a function of the self ’s own
needs as an identity.56
The point being, the manner of dialogue DoC initiatives have aspired to foster has
been less than dialogical in above-elaborated Bakhtinian sense. This may come
across as paradoxical in that forthcoming proponents of DoC have avowedly expressed
interest in ﬁnding oneself in the other. Consider the following quote by President
Khatami:
One goal of dialogue among cultures and civilizations is to recognize and understand not
only cultures and civilizations of others, but those of ‘one’s own’. We could know ourselves by
taking a step away from ourselves and embarking on a journey away from self and homeland
and eventually attaining a more profound appreciation of our true identity. It is only through
immersion into another existential dimension that we could attain mediated and acquired
knowledge of ourselves in addition to the immediate and direct knowledge of ourselves that
we commonly possess. Through seeing others we attain a hitherto impossible knowledge of
ourselves.57
Be that as it may, dialogism cannot ﬂourish unless it is adopted as ethics and episte-
mology. As Mustapha Kamal Pasha has underscored, ‘recognition of change and
changeability . . . without deconstructing the logic of Western historicism only offers a
halfway house’.58 Such deconstruction calls for a dialogical epistemology in understand-
ing civilisations. DoC initiatives, however, have built upon a monological epistemology.
A dialogical epistemology would allow dialogues between past and present. As
opposed to, that is, seeking dialogue in the present as if no such dialogue was/is
possible in/with the past (in DoC). To quote Guillaume:
Dialogism represents the interweaving of utterances that respond to one another, an utterance
being characterised by its expression, its context and its relation to other utterances, whether
this relation is present and/or past, active or passive.59
In contrast to DoC’s monological epistemology, which does not acknowledge past
encounters other than surface interaction and assumes ideas and institutions having
a single point of origin, adopting a dialogical epistemology has allowed John M.
Hobson to uncover already existing dialogue between civilisations. In his appositely
titled book, Eastern Origins of Western Civilization, Hobson wrote:
55 Guillaume, ‘Foreign Policy and the Politics of Alterity, p. 8. On dialogue as ethical practice, also see
Mavelli, where the author builds upon Martin Buber, one of the inspirations for Bakhtinian dialogism:
Mavelli, Europe’s encounter with Islam: the secular and the postsecular, pp. 141–45.
56 Guillaume, ‘Foreign Policy and the Politics of Alterity’, p. 9.
57 Quoted in Petito, ‘The Global Political Discourse of Dialogue among Civilizations’, p. 111. Compare
with: Davutog˘lu, ‘Medeniyetlerin Ben-idraki [Self-cognition of Civilizations]’.
58 Mustapha Kamal Pasha, ‘Civilizations, Postorientalism, and Islam’, in Martin Hall and Patrick Thaddeus
Jackson (eds), Civilizational identity: the production and reproduction of ‘civilizations’ in international
relations (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 70.
59 Guillaume, ‘Foreign Policy and the Politics of Alterity’, p. 8.
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The East enabled the rise of the West through two main processes: diffusionism/assimilationism
and appropriationism. First, the Easterners created a global economy and a global communi-
cations network after 500 along which the more advanced Eastern ‘resource portfolios’ [for
example, Eastern ideas, institutions and technologies] diffused across to the West, where they
were subsequently assimilated, through what I call oriental globalisation. And second, Western
imperialism after 1492 led the Europeans to appropriate all manner of Eastern economic
resources to enable the rise of the West. In short, the West did not autonomously pioneer its
own development in the absence of Eastern help, for its rise would have been inconceivable
without the contribution of the East.60
What is at stake in adopting dialogism as both ethics and epistemology is more than
uncovering historical debts, but DoC initiatives’ ability to fulﬁl the promise of foster-
ing dialogue. That co-constitution of civilisations took place centuries ago does not
render it mere academic curiosity that is inconsequential for present-day policies
and politics. In pursuing this line of argument, I part ways with Fabio Petito who
has maintained that
the retrieving of the shared world historical heritage can be politically important, but it does
not equate to the retrieving, re-actualisation and mobilisation of the social ethics of the great
civilizational and religious traditions of the world.61
Be that as it may, adopting a dialogical epistemology reveals how ‘the social ethics
of the great civilizational and religious traditions of the world’62 have not developed
autochthonously but have co-constituted throughout history.63 What is at issue, then,
is not merely the retrieval of a common heritage but, even more importantly, recognis-
ing multiple civilizations’ contributions to what are popularly portrayed as ‘Western’
ideas and institutions.
Writing ideas and institutions such as human rights and democracy out of the
heritage of civilisations other than ‘the West’ does not only render invisible others’
contributions to the making of such ideas and institutions, but also ends up substan-
tiating the extremists’ theses. For, assumptions regarding ideas and institutions (such
as democracy and human rights) having a single (Western) point of origin have
warranted Huntingtonians’ calls for strengthening their own vis-a`-vis the non-West
and Muslim extremists’ cautions against Western plots to export ‘alien’ values to
the Muslim world. The point being, in the absence of dialogical approaches to civili-
sations and dialogue, the promise of fostering dialogue is likely to remain unfulﬁlled.
Such an outcome may come across as paradoxical in that the very purpose of
pursuing a Dialogue of Civilisations was to render differences between political actors
less existential and more interest-based.64 However, in the absence of due recognition
of multiple agencies in the emergence of ideas and institutions that are otherwise
portrayed as exclusively ‘Western’ inventions, dialogue would be difﬁcult to foster.
Approaching the notion of dialogue as both ethics and epistemology would help fulﬁl
DoC promise of fostering dialogue.
60 John M. Hobson, The Eastern origins of Western civilization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2004), pp. 2–3.
61 Petito, ‘In Defence of Dialogue of Civilizations’, p. 766.
62 Ibid.
63 Alker, ‘If Not Huntington’s ‘‘Civilizations’’, Then Whose?’.
64 Lynch, ‘The Dialogue of Civilisations and International Public Spheres’.
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Security
The foregoing has argued that DoC initiatives suffer from signiﬁcant limitations in
their conceptualisation of civilisation and dialogue, thereby rendering unfulﬁlled the
promise of fostering dialogue. This eventuality does not bode well for addressing in-
securities identiﬁed by the proponents of DoC, that is, violent clashes between states
belonging to different civilisations.
Another limitation of DoC initiatives becomes apparent when judged by the stan-
dards of critical approaches to security, whereby DoC conception of security is found
wanting in terms of both breadth and depth. In what follows, the article highlights
insecurities that are likely to remain unidentiﬁed and unaddressed in the process of
seeking security through DoC.
Before pursuing this argument further, it is important to underscore that propo-
nents of DoC are not unaware of insecurities experienced by non-state referents.
Rather, they unambiguously choose to prioritise a statist and military-focused notion
of security, which they practice through seeking to maintain the stability of inter-
state order. Fred Dallmayr, a forthcoming academic proponent of DoC initiatives
has justiﬁed DoC choice for instituting such a hierarchy of insecurities and referents
by alluding to the risks involved in a clash:
Apart from ethical considerations . . . there is also a concrete pragmatic consideration in its
favour: in the long run [Dialogue of Civilisations] offers the only viable alternative to military
confrontation with its ever-present danger of nuclear holocaust and global self-destruction.65
The following is not meant to underplay the risks involved, but to highlight those
insecurities that are tied up with the institution of such hierarchies of insecurities
and referents as such.
We need look no further than the Cold War to see an earlier instance of such
a hierarchy. During the Cold War, the threat of nuclear exchange between the two
superpowers was put on the top of the security agenda, thereby privileging stability
in superpower relations. Those who sought to push other insecurities onto the agenda
(practitioners included the Non-Aligned Movement [NAM] or those who called for a
New International Economic Order [NIEO]; feminists and environmentalists gained
ground both in the academia and social movements) were disciplined into accepting
this hierarchy. Those who refused to buy into the Cold War hierarchy were labelled
‘naı¨ve’ at best.66
In present-day context, proponents of DoC who push for civilisational dialogue
as an urgent remedy for what they fear to be an impending clash institute a similar
hierarchy of insecurities and referents. In so doing, they privilege the security of
states and marginalise insecurities experienced by non-state referents. What warrants
such a hierarchy is a narrow and shallow notion of security (again, reminiscent of the
Cold War).67
65 Dallmayr, Dialogue Among Civilizations, p. 21.
66 On Cold War in/security hierarchies, see, for example, J. Ann Tickner, Gender in International Relations:
Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1992);
Ken Booth, ‘Security and self: reﬂections of a fallen realist’, in Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams
(eds), Critical security studies: concepts and cases (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997),
pp. 83–119.
67 Pinar Bilgin, Ken Booth, and Richard Wyn Jones, ‘Security Studies: The Next Stage?’, Nacao e Defesa,
84 (1998), pp. 137–57.
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DoC notion of security is narrow in that the challenge of post-secularism is under-
stood by its proponents in terms of a potential for a violent clash between states
belonging to different civilisations. Accordingly, the kind of security DoC initiatives
practice is a search for maintaining the stability of inter-state order understood in
military-focused and statist terms.
DoC notion of security is also shallow in that its proponents do not elaborate on
security as a derivative concept; as deriving from ‘different underlying understand-
ings of the character and purpose of politics’.68 DoC failure to consider one’s role in
the production of insecurities as such overlooks ethics already embedded in their
practices even as they seek to inject ‘ethics’ into world politics.69 Put differently,
DoC initiatives overlook the potential consequences of ordering the world around
assumptions of ontological difference at the civilisational level while assuming civili-
sations to be uniﬁed (religiously and otherwise). Such assumptions of internal same-
ness and failure to recognise one’s own culpability in the production of insecurity
would result in leaving myriad insecurities unidentiﬁed and unaddressed. Let me
consider three concrete instances of such insecurity.
First, adopting a notion of civilisation as a religiously uniﬁed entity, without due
recognition of power/knowledge dynamics within religions, results in overlooking
insecurities that are tied up with such dynamics. For, religion is not a neutral space
devoid of politics. By way of adopting this particular notion of civilisation and reli-
gion, projects of DoC overlook – what Friedrich Kratochwil referred to as – the
‘ambivalent effect of religion on political and social life’.70 Whereas
nothing follows from religion as such (conceived as a creed or an assemblage of holy texts),
until and unless the practices and institutional features are taken into account. Without
analyzing this interpretative struggle and the shifting boundaries between the sacred and the
profane, not much can be learned from studying the holy texts or from reading the ofﬁcial
pronouncements that recite them as legitimizing source.71
Indeed, answering Shirin Ebadi’s question ‘who deﬁnes Islam?’72 is far from being
uncontroversial. Thus, in the absence of sociopolitical analyses of religions and civili-
sations, treating civilisations as religiously uniﬁed entities, and religions as politically
neutral spaces would not allow inquiring into struggles and conﬂicts within civilisa-
tions (and religions) let alone their implications for myriad security referents.73
The second and related instance of insecurity has to do with DoC initiatives render-
ing authoritative the voices of self-appointed civilisational leaders whose version of
that civilisation gets portrayed as ‘authentic and real’.74 Such portrayals leave indi-
viduals and social groups’ security at the mercy of self-appointed civilisational leaders
who claim to ‘provide not only the ‘‘correct’’ understanding of the holy texts but
authoritatively apply them also to the present circumstances’.75 While civilisational
68 Ken Booth, Theory of World Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 109.
69 J. Peter Burgess, ‘Security as Ethics’, PRIO policy brief (2008); J. Peter Burgess, The Ethical Subject of
Security: Geopolitical Reason and The Threat to Europe (London: Routledge, 2010).
70 Kratochwil, ‘Religion and (inter-)national politics’, p. 113.
71 Ibid., p. 114.
72 Shirin Ebadi, ‘Who Deﬁnes Islam?’, openDemocracy, {www.opendemocracy.net} accessed 1 February
2012.
73 It is not only DoC initiatives but also the project of multiculturalism that suffers from such a problem of
silence when it comes to internal struggles within civilisations, thereby effacing difference within. For a
feminist perspective, see Ebadi, ‘Who Deﬁnes Islam?’.
74 Lynch, ‘The Dialogue of Civilisations and International Public Spheres’, p. 324.
75 Kratochwil, ‘Religion and (inter-)national politics’, p. 132.
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leaders need not be religious leaders, more often than not they invoke religious
‘truths’ in exercising such leadership. Consider, for instance, a statement by Turkey’s
dialogue-oriented PM Erdog˘an, who responded to the ruling of the European Court
of Human Rights on the issue of the headscarf ban at Turkey’s universities in the
following way:76
The court has no say over this matter. It is the ulema who has a right to speak. You should
consult with those who belong to that religion, be they Jewish or Christian; you ask them
whether this matter is a religious obligation. If it is, you have to respect that. If it is not, that is
a different matter, political, ideological. If it is a religious matter, you have to respect that. I
have studied this matter. It is a mistake to pass judgement on this matter without consulting
the Muslim ulema.77
However, as Talal Asad reminds us, ‘precisely because there is a disagreement among
contemporary pious Muslims as to whether the headscarf is a divinely required accou-
terment for women, its – religious signiﬁcance must be [all the more] indeterminate’.78
Be that as it may, coalitions between religious leaders, self-proclaimed spokes-
persons of civilisations and policymakers who justify their decisions by invoking
religious ‘truths’ have already produced insecurities for peoples and social groups.
Consider the alliance between the Vatican, Saudi Arabia, and Iran that has shaped
the UN’s policy on issues related to birth control and use of condoms.79 Insecurities
for women (high levels of death during child-birth), children (high levels of infant
mortality), and others (hiv-aids) have followed. The second instance of insecurity I
identify, then, occurs when self-appointed leaders of civilisations justify their policy
choices with reference to the ‘essence’ of their civilisation whereby non-state referents
ﬁnd it increasingly difﬁcult to identify with anything other than their ascribed civili-
sation, voice insecurities other than those identiﬁed by their ‘civilizational leader’, or
question the kind of solutions they offer.
A third instance of insecurity tied up with DoC initiatives is that is that they con-
stitute ‘a deferral of a genuine recognition, exploration, and engagement of difference’.80
This is because DoC initiatives take differences in civilisational identity as a pre-given
source of insecurity for inter-state world order. Whereas elaborating security as a
derivative concept and inquiring into the ethics of security would allow insight into
processes whereby insecurities and identities are (re)produced within (and between,
see previous sections) civilisations. Be it religious or ethnic or civilisational, ‘identity
is not a fact of society’ but a ‘process of negotiation among people and interest
groups’.81 Correspondingly, to quote Bill McSweeney, ‘the security problem is not
there because people have separate identities; it may well be the case that they have
separate identities because of the security problem’.82 The third instance of insecurity
identiﬁed here is that, by way of treating difference as pre-given and locating difference
76 The court had ruled that the Turkish state was within its rights in banning headscarf from Universities.
See {http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4424776.stm} accessed 15 February 2012.
77 ‘Erdog˘an Doktrini [Erdog˘an Doctrine]’, Milliyet, 16 November 2005.
78 Asad quoted in: Mavelli, Europe’s encounter with Islam: the secular and the postsecular, p. 72. While
Asad’s remark is directed against non-Muslims who pass judgment on Muslim ‘religious’ symbols, his
elaboration on religion as a plural space is relevant for Muslims and non-Muslims alike.
79 Fred Halliday, ‘The End of the Vatican’, openDemocracy, {www.opendemocracy.net} accessed 1
September 2007.
80 Inayatullah and Blaney, International Relations and the Problem of Difference.
81 Bill McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 239.
82 McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests, p. 239.
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‘outside’ without due regard for processes of production of identity/security, DoC
initiatives have so far deferred both the problem of difference and ethics of security.
Such deferral, in turn, has allowed for insecurities to remain if not become more
entrenched within and between civilisations.
To recapitulate, in the absence of sociopolitical insights into plurality and power/
knowledge dynamics within civilisations, seeking security through civilisational dia-
logue would result in ordering the world outside-in. What I mean by ordering the
world outside-in is an outcome of the process whereby the proponents of DoC seek
to secure inter-civilisational relations while assuming intra-civilisational dynamics to
be characterised by security and remaining oblivious to insecurities produced by the
very process. Consequently, insecurities experienced by non-state referents remain
unidentiﬁed and unaddressed.
Conclusion
The foregoing has sought to highlight the challenge of post-secularism for world
politics by pointing to the limitations of civilisational dialogue initiatives that have
been offered as a remedy. Toward this end, the article has: (1) considered the extent
to which DoC initiatives are likely to address those insecurities they identify; and (2)
pointed to other insecurities that are likely to remain unidentiﬁed and unaddressed in
the process. Whereas the ﬁrst evaluates DoC initiatives by their own standards, the
second evaluates them by the standards of critical approaches to security. It was
argued that DoC initiatives, insofar as they bracket civilisation, under-elaborate
dialogue thereby overlooking already existing historical dialogue between civilisa-
tions, and privilege the security of inter-state order while deferring the problem of
difference and ethics of security, are far from offering a comprehensive response in
light of the challenge of post-secularism.
This is not to underestimate the signiﬁcant contributions dialogue between civili-
sations could make. Indeed, I join Petito in underscoring the need to
acknowledge something like a fundamental ethical-political crisis linked to the present liberal
Western civilization and its expansion, and recognize that dialogue of civilizations seems to
enshrine the promise of an answer, or rather to start a path toward an answer.83
That said what civilisational dialogue initiatives offer in terms of responding to the
challenge of post-secularism is a ‘potential’. And, as Kratochwil has highlighted,
this is an ‘ambivalent’ potential due to the ‘interpretative struggles’ that go on within
communities.84 Limiting our analysis to politics between civilisations amounts to over-
looking the politics that take place within civilisations. Seeking to foster civilisational
dialogue without paying due attention to the production of security/identity within
and between civilisations is likely to have an uncertain contribution to the security
of various referents – particularly those that are deemed ‘different’.
Coming to terms with the persistence of the problem of difference in world politics
impels us to ponder the question: ‘how might we respond to the somewhat or mostly
incommensurable visions and traditions of others?’85 While it is important to applaud
83 Petito, ‘In Defence of Dialogue of Civilizations’, p. 763.
84 Kratochwil, ‘Religion and (inter-)national politics’.
85 Inayatullah and Blaney, International Relations and the Problem of Difference, p. 9. Also see, Pasha,
‘Civilizations, Postorientalism, and Islam’, p. 63.
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DoC call for ‘reopening and rediscussion of the core of Western-centric and liberal
assumptions upon which the normative structure of the contemporary international
society is based’,86 it is equally critical to recognise multiple agencies in the making
of what we presently view as ‘Western’ ideas and institutions; rethink Western and
Islamic civilisations (among others) along non-essentialist lines to allow for further
dialogue; and seek sociopolitical insight into the dynamics of intra-civilisational rela-
tions. An alternative approach to DoC that elaborates on the notions of civilisation,
dialogue, and security whereby the problem of difference and ethics of security are
not deferred, would likely have very different implications for the security of individuals,
social groups, and states. One ethical question that state-level proponents of DoC
have so far not asked is a dialogical question: ‘how to be with others without assum-
ing what it is to be or what it is to be other’.87
86 Petito, ‘In Defence of Dialogue of Civilizations’, p. 762.
87 Burke paraphrasing Kristeva. See Anthony Burke, Beyond security, ethics and violence: war against the
other (New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 105.
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